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Synthesis
Payments for ecosystem services: a review of definitions, the role of spatial
scales, and critique
Josef Kaiser 1, Dagmar Haase 1,2 and Tobias Krueger 1,3
ABSTRACT. The economic conservation instrument of payments for ecosystem services (PES) enjoys an increasing popularity among
scientists, politicians, and civil society organizations alike, while others raise concerns regarding the ecological effectiveness and social
justice of this instrument. In this review article, we showcase the variety of existing PES definitions and systematically locate these
definitions in the range between Coasean conceptualizations, which describe PES as conditional and voluntary private negotiations
between ES providers and ES beneficiaries, and much broader Pigouvian PES understandings that also assign government-funded and
involuntary schemes to the PES approach. It turns out that the scale at which PES operate, having so far received very little attention
in the literature, as well as critique of PES must be considered in the context of the diversity of definitions to ensure the comparability
between studies researching PES programs. Future research should better target linkages between global, regional, and local scales for
the development of PES programs, while taking local collective governance systems for a sustainable use of resources into account
more seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
The critical state of ecosystems worldwide has sparked a debate
about which environmental policy instruments are best suited to
establish a socially and ecologically sustainable society. In
academic as well as political circles the ecosystem services (ES)
approach and related policy instruments such as payments for
ecosystem services (PES) are highlighted as a promising solution
to halt the degradation of ecosystems. The prominent Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment defines ES as “benefits that people obtain
from ecosystems” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005:V),
although this definition is criticized for its anthropocentric view
on ES and its imprecision (Farley and Costanza 2010, Gómez-
Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011, Danley and Widmark 2016,
Farley 2020). Many ES can be denoted as market externalities
because of their open access or public good character. From a
Neoclassical economics point of view, these services are not
properly considered in the decision-making process of economic
actors because of their lack of representation within the market
sphere (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011). PES make ES
valuable in monetary terms by rewarding ES providers for their
conservation efforts using positive and conditional economic
incentives, thereby aiming at internalizing market externalities
(McElwee et al. 2014). This is why some critics see PES as
contributing to the tendency of complementing or replacing
classical regulatory conservation policies with economic or even
market-based instruments (Sattler et al. 2013). However, in the
literature, it is controversially discussed whether PES contribute
to an increase of monetization and commodification processes in
conservation policies (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010, Wunder
2013).  
Over the last 15 years, the scientific publications addressing PES
skyrocketed. This rise has been paralleled by a growing interest
of national governments, as well as of national and international
civil society organizations (CSO) focusing on conservation and
poverty reduction (Duncan 2006, Huberman 2008, Oxfam 2014).
At the same time, the number of implemented PES programs has
been increasing. Current estimates assume over 550 PES
programs worldwide (Salzman et al. 2018). However, these
estimations vary because of the diverging understandings of PES
in the literature leading to diverse definitions and
conceptualizations (Wunder 2015). Different authors have
highlighted already that there is a large range of PES
understandings reaching from a narrow Coasean PES
conceptualization, where payments from ES users are transferred
to ES providers on a private, voluntary, and conditional basis, to
the Pigouvian PES conceptualization including also involuntary
and governmentally financed programs (Sattler and Matzdorf
2013). Therefore, research projects require a clarification of the
underlying conceptualization of PES as a working basis in order
to allow for a comparable evaluation of the social and ecological
outcomes of PES programs.  
It can be assumed that current globalization trends and thus
spatial scales affect these ecological and social outcomes of PES
programs strongly, since the rapid land use changes and
environmental destructions characteristic of our time take place
within interconnected, global human-environmental systems
(Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011, Meyfroidt et al. 2013). Yet,
analyzing the various drivers of environmental destruction and
drawing causal relations is challenging because of the very
globally telecoupled nature of these systems (Friis et al. 2016).
This complexity challenge makes it all the more important to take
scale issues into account when designing and evaluating PES
programs. And the clear definition basis required to guarantee
the comparability between research projects studying PES
programs needs to take those scalar dependencies into account.  
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Many scholars have a rather skeptical view on PES or even deny
the effectiveness of this conservation instrument. For example,
some authors criticize that PES potentially downplay the
complexity of ecosystems because of the commercialization and
commodification tendencies that are often associated with this
instrument (Norgaard 2010, Büscher et al. 2012, Scales 2015).
Furthermore, the pure focus on monetary exchange values
arguably hides the existing plurality of values (Vatn 2010). Other
scholars recognize PES as a market-based and neoliberal
conservation tool that pushes privatizations and potentially even
reinforces existing inequalities (Kosoy and Corbera 2010,
McElwee 2012).  
We see a need to draw interconnections between these three issues
—the diversity of PES definitions, the role of spatial scales for
PES program effectiveness, and the existing critique of this
environmental policy instrument—to reveal contradictions and
research gaps in the current scientific debate. To achieve this aim,
our study focuses on the following research questions:  
. Which definitions exist for PES and what are the differences
between them? 
. How is the influence of spatial scales on PES program
effectiveness discussed in the literature? 
. Which critique of PES schemes is outlined in the literature? 
. How does the diversity of definitions affect the research
about spatial scale impacts on PES program effectiveness
and the accuracy of critique of PES schemes? 
To answer these research questions, we applied a systematic
literature review. First, we gathered existing PES definitions and
classified them according to key features, building on earlier
studies by, for example, Wunder (2015). Second, we collected and
systemized published research results about the role of spatial
scales on PES program effectiveness. Third, we systematically
clustered existing points of critique of PES programs using an
inductive literature search approach that focused especially on
critique of the reputedly neoliberal nature of PES. Fourth, we
examined how the existence of different PES understandings
affects scale issues and related PES critique.
METHODS
This review is based on a systematic literature search using the
literature database Scopus, because this search engine provides a
very high coverage of peer-reviewed literature (Mongeon and
Paul-Hus 2016). We developed the underlying search
terminologies based on the authors’ knowledge and a preliminary
analysis of 14 papers that have close thematic associations with
the research objectives. After applying the search terminologies
in Scopus, we selected relevant papers published between 2000
and 2018 by reviewing the abstracts or, if  full-text assessments
were required, by reviewing the whole paper focusing on the search
terms. This procedure followed the PRISMA guideline (Moher
et al. 2009). To aid analysis of the papers found we developed a
coding structure using the qualitative research software
MAXQDA. The coding structure enabled us to cluster the
relevant topics addressing the research questions, which led us to
the guiding structure of the results section. When other relevant
publications addressing the research questions were referenced
within the identified papers, we integrated these publications into
the literature review as well (snowball system). Moreover, if
statements from other authors relevant to our research interest
were cited within the papers, we traced them back to the primary
publications. In total, we applied three systematic literature
searches referring to the research objectives of this study. A
detailed overview of the search terminologies and the papers
identified as eligible can be found in Figure 1 and in Appendices
1–3, indicating also publications that we have detected based on
the snowball system.  
In the first systematic literature review we identified PES
definitions by using two different search terminologies, developed
on the basis of five publications that either contain the most
famous definitions or give an overview of PES conceptualizations
(Wunder 2005, Muradian et al. 2010, Sattler et al. 2013, Sattler
and Matzdorf 2013, Wunder 2015). The first terminology
includes a full-text search that combines different terms of PES
with the word stem “defin*” to include the terms “definition” and
“define” as well as further variations. We included both terms
“payments for ecosystem services” and “payments for
environmental services” as well as the abbreviation “PES” in the
search terminology. Although some authors use both terms
interchangeably, various differentiations are outlined in the
literature (Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann 2013, Souza et al.
2016). For reasons of consistency we only use the term “payments
for ecosystem services” in our writing, which is also the most
common. However, because we were interested in getting an
overview of the full range of definitions, the term “payments for
environmental services” was also applied in the literature search.
We set the distance between the PES terms and “defin*” at a
maximum of 15 words. This number is based on a statement of
Elsevier, according to which an average sentence in scientific
papers counts 12 to 17 words, leading to a rounded up midpoint
of 15 words (Borja 2015). Furthermore, we applied a search within
abstracts, titles, and keywords to identify publications containing
PES as well as the terms “coase*” and “pigou*,” because the non-
systematic pre-literature review indicated the importance of a
Coasean and a Pigouvian conceptualization of PES.  
Second, we examined the role of spatial scales for PES program
effectiveness by searching for the word stem “scal*” in
combination with PES in titles, abstracts, and keywords. We did
not add limitations such as “geographical” or “spatial” in
combination with “scale” in this search terminology, so that no
important papers would be missed. Additionally, we used a full-
text search to identify papers containing the combination of PES
with the stem of “effectiveness,” “efficiency,” or “success,” again
with a maximum distance of 15 words. We grounded the
development of this search terminology in publications of Farley
et al. (2010), Farley and Costanza (2010), and Ezzine-De-Blas et
al. (2016), who highlighted the scale issue in the context of PES
programs.  
Third, based on the pre-assessment of relevant literature
(Robertson 2006, Goméz-Baggethun et al. 2010, Kosoy and
Corbera 2010, McAfee and Shapiro 2010, Goméz-Baggethun and
Ruiz-Pérez 2011, Muradian et al. 2013), we identified critique of
PES applying an inductive approach using the terms
“neoliberal*” and “neoclassic*” as entrance gate for gathering
publications. We rejected the use of the term “critique” and
variations of it, because this search terminology provided too
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Fig. 1. Methodological steps of this study and quantitative results of the literature review.
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Fig. 2. Number of citations of the publications containing the identified payments for ecosystem services (PES) definitions using
Google Scholar; total number of citations between 2005 and 2018 in brackets; highlighting of the two most cited definitions.
many results not containing critique specifically of PES programs.
Thus, we decided to focus on critique that addresses the neoliberal
character of PES, which narrowed the results significantly.
Nevertheless, this narrow selection was successful in identifying
publications touching various highly relevant fields of critique,
also by pointing to additional publications.
RESULTS
PES definitions differ fundamentally
In total, we identified 76 papers as eligible. Most of them referred
to other authors’ PES definitions, while only a minority actually
came up with new definitions. We detected 13 definitions that
aimed at providing a reconceptualization of PES. Some authors
also developed new concepts such as “reward-based” definitions.
However, such concepts that intentionally transcend the PES
debate were excluded to set a focus on the PES term. An overview
of alternative terms apart from the classical PES term is given,
for example, by Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann (2013).  
By far the most cited definition, which is referred to as a Coasean
style PES definition, was published by Wunder (2005) and is often
mentioned as a market-close conceptualization with reference to
the Coase theorem, which highlights the advantages of voluntary
private negotiations (Coase 1960). In contrast, a second famous
definition by Muradian et al. (2010) is often described as a
Pigouvian conceptualization that incorporates (partly) involuntary
and not necessarily strictly conditional positive incentive
mechanisms. For a detailed description of Coasean and
Pigouvian views on PES see, for example, Sattler and Matzdorf
(2013). An overview of the citation frequency of the publications
containing PES definitions is shown in Figure 2.  
Hereafter, the focus is placed on the key criteria we identified by
reviewing the 13 definitions. We subdivide the criteria in ex-ante
design and ex-post effectiveness criteria. Ex-ante criteria address
the concept and design of a specific PES program. In contrast,
ex-post criteria relate to the resulting effectiveness and can thus
only be evaluated for programs already running. The differing
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features of the definitions are systematically compiled in Table 1.
The original definitions are available in Appendix 1.
Ex-ante criteria
One of the main criteria of PES is the use of positive incentives
for landowners that in return provide ES. In theory, the payment
level refers to the providers’ willingness to accept, which strongly
corresponds with direct costs for ES provision as well as with
opportunity costs (Ferraro 2008); however, in practice the
payments often do not cover these costs (Kosoy et al. 2007, Kosoy
and Corbera 2010). Even though only four definitions highlight
this criterion directly, the other definitions include it implicitly.
Thus, PES can be clearly distinguished from other economic
environmental policy instruments that build on negative
incentives meaning that ES providers get monetarily punished for
the non-provisioning of ES. This is the case for Pigou taxes that
build on the polluters pay principle in contrast to the stewards
earn principle (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011).
Although most PES schemes build on monetary incentives, some
authors highlight the opportunity of in-kind payments, which are,
however, rare in practice (Sommerville et al. 2009).  
Conditionality is the key criterion of most definitions (11 out of
13 evaluated definitions) and “makes PES the frontrunner of a
new paradigm of contractual conservation” (Wunder 2015:241).
Conditionality means that payments to ES providers are only
made if  the provision of the ES can be contractually secured,
making clearly defined and enforced property rights and good
monitoring necessary (Engel 2015, Wunder 2015). The literature
hints at several distinctions between conditionality types. Most
prominent is the differentiation between input or action-based
and output or performance-based conditionality (Matzdorf et al.
2013, Reutemann et al. 2016). The former focuses on generally
environmentally friendly land-use actions that are assumed to
secure some ES, while the latter refers to individually measured
ES. In practice, input conditionality is much more common
(Martin-Ortega and Waylen 2018). This is due to the easier and
cheaper monitoring of compliance, while the measurement of
direct ES flows is often challenging (Lima et al. 2017).  
The notion of well-definition of ES, as mentioned in Wunder’s
primary definition, is strongly connected with the conditionality
criterion, because for an explicit monitoring of ES a
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quantification is essential, especially in the case of output-
conditionality (Wunder 2005). However, Corbera and colleagues
(2007) point out that operating PES programs are often based on
ill-defined ES.  
Voluntariness is another often named key feature of PES
definitions. Full or partial voluntariness is included in eight out
of the 13 analyzed definitions. In the Coasean conceptualization,
voluntariness optimally applies to both providers and
beneficiaries of ES (Wunder 2005, 2015). As in a market, the
involved parties can decide independently if  they want to sell or
respectively buy the commodified ES. In such cases the program
is purely voluntary. However, PES schemes can also be (partly)
involuntary. In such cases they are rather “driven by compliance
regulation, both on the demand or the supply side” (Sattler and
Matzdorf 2013:3). In practice, involuntariness on the providers’
respectively buyers’ side occurs mostly because of governmental
interventions (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013).  
The directness of transfer is related to the actors involved in the
transaction. Whereas in the Coasean conceptualization the
transfer goes from the beneficiary directly to the providing actor
(e.g., Wunder 2015), in a Pigouvian view payments can also be
generated by public sources or actors that do not directly benefit
from the ES provision (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). The
directness of transfer is often subdivided into user- versus
government-financed PES schemes (Van Hecken et al. 2012,
Sattler and Matzdorf 2013, Wunder 2015). Unlike Wunder’s
definition, Corbera et al. (2007) describe PES as mostly
government-funded, thus not being fully voluntary. National and
international CSOs can also play a crucial role, whether as
intermediary or as ES provider or buyer (Sattler et al. 2013, Grima
et al. 2016). We found one definition that includes eco-
certification as a form of indirect payment (Milder et al. 2010).
Only two of the 13 definitions name direct payments from ES
users to providers as a key feature (Karsenty 2011, Wunder 2015).
Wunder’s definition from 2005 uses the term buyer instead of user
or beneficiary. However, based on the further details in his
publication it can be concluded that this definition primarily
focuses on ES users. In his later definition (2015) this criterion is
substantiated.  
Tacconi (2012) adds transparency as a further important
definition criterion. Kolstad and Wiig (2009), as cited in Tacconi
(2012) define transparency “as the timely and reliable provision
of information to all relevant stakeholders” (Tacconi 2012:33).
Ex-post criteria
Whereas the ex-ante criteria address the policy instrument design,
the ex-post criteria identified in four definitions focus on the aims
of PES programs. Sommerville et al. (2009), Tacconi (2012), and
Davies et al. (2018) posit additionality as an important criterion.
Additionality can only be verified in retrospect and means that
“ES benefits (or proxy land use practices) are over-and-above the
baseline (or business-as-usual) level, and do not lead to the loss
or degradation of ES elsewhere” (Davies et al. 2018:160). Thus,
additionality is closely connected to conditionality.  
Muradian et al. (2010:1205) include also welfare gains in their
definition by using the term “social interest.” In this view, social
justice and poverty alleviation are, besides environmental
additionality, important goals of PES schemes (Van Noordwijk
and Leimona 2010, Shelley 2011). This criterion is difficult to
assess, both because of its normative character, which depends to
a large extent on the chosen principle of justice, and difficulties
regarding social impact evaluation (Wunder 2015). However, in
the literature, PES are often highlighted as a win-win approach,
reducing poverty and ecosystem degradation simultaneously
(Pagiola et al. 2005, Muradian et al. 2013).
Spatial scales matter and need to be set in context with the
diversity of definitions
The role of spatial scales for the environmental and social
effectiveness of PES programs has not been sufficiently examined
in the literature; most of the 40 papers detected as eligible rarely
touch upon the issue of spatial, or geographical, scales. However,
spatial scales play a crucial role in science and politics because
scientific analyses that study and measure processes or objects, as
well as political actions, prominently refer to specific scales
(Gibson et al. 2000). Observed phenomena at one scale are often
not generalizable for other scales, making a careful consideration
of scale aspects necessary, especially against the background of
a globalized world.  
One often mentioned issue addresses the distinction between the
scale of ES provision versus the scale of ES benefits. Whereas ES
accrue locally, the scale of direct benefits from the provided
services is largely dependent on the ES type (den Uyl and Driessen
2015). Therefore, Farley and colleagues (2010:2075) state: “[a]
serious obstacle [for conservation] ... is the fact that ecosystem
services provide benefits at a variety of spatial scales, ranging from
the local to the global.” For example, pollination services are
usually distributed locally, water-related services are spread over
local or regional scales, whereas the benefits of carbon
sequestration services are globally distributed (Corbera et al.
2009, Kemkes et al. 2010, Banerjee et al. 2013, Kull et al. 2015).
Thus, within PES programs, the scale of benefits should be
considered carefully, because “understanding the spatial
distribution of ecosystem services is key to identifying potential
beneficiaries, the institutions required to provide the service and
the transaction costs associated with provision” (Kemkes et al.
2010:2072). Referring to Wunder’s definition (2015), the funding
source depends directly on the scale of ES benefits, because payers
are ES beneficiaries/users by definition. In contrast, this is not
the case for definitions that mention agents who do not directly
use ES as potential ES buyers. Thus, clarity regarding the
underlying definition is central when discussing scale aspects of
PES programs. Only broader definitions include large
international programs (IPES), except for programs addressing
globally distributed carbon ES. Other ES types can only indirectly
provide large-scaled international benefits, e.g., by securing the
production of agricultural goods that are traded globally.  
Some authors emphasize cross-scale mismatches between
ecological and social processes as a “key challenge in social-
ecological systems” (Cerra 2017:595). These mismatches find their
expression, for example, in scale differences between ecosystem
management, ecological processes, and the spatial payment levels
(Reed et al. 2014). In addition, the sphere of managing institutions
and the jurisdictional scale rarely match the targeted
environmental area, which calls for a better consideration of
potential mismatches when designing PES programs
(Meadowcroft 2002, Corbera et al. 2009, Loft 2011, Van der Horst
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2011, den Uyl and Driessen 2015, Huber-Stearns et al. 2017).
However, rearrangements or new formations of institutions and
especially of land tenure in order to solve these scale-mismatches
can also lead to problems, because they bear the risk of unhinging
well-functioning local governance structures (Favretto et al. 2016,
Reed et al. 2017).  
Many authors argue that local and regional schemes provide a
range of advantages compared to national or international
schemes. There are indications that local scale PES programs are
more effective (Agrawal et al. 2014, Grima et al. 2016). Scholars
explain this, for example, with the incorporation of local and/or
indigenous knowledge, which would allow for a better
identification of appropriate actors as well as costs and benefits
(Grima et al. 2016, Paudyal et al. 2016). Local knowledge arguably
eases decision and policy making and potentially increases the
social learning of the PES participants, which creates
opportunities for a collective management of resources (Lockie
2013, Grima et al. 2016). This, together with an easier
identification and matching of buyers and sellers (OECD 2013),
has the potential to lower the transaction and enforcement costs
significantly. Some authors argue that also in case of globally
distributed benefits it is reasonable to incorporate beneficiaries
as locally as possible to guarantee low transaction costs (Kemkes
et al. 2010, Thompson 2018). On the other hand, this incentivizes
free-riding at the global scale (Farley et al. 2010, OECD 2013).
Local schemes are promising also because of the stakeholders´
motivation to participate in PES programs as well as because the
ES appreciation tends to increase with a smaller distance to the
location providing ES (den Uyl and Driessen 2015, Thompson
2018). In general, given a preference for local PES schemes, it is
important for the setup of programs to get the appropriate actors
involved (Lockie 2013). This can lead to a trade-off  between
getting enough participants involved, while being as local as
possible (Banerjee et al. 2013, Lockie 2013, Sorice et al. 2018).  
In practice, most PES schemes operate at local or regional scales
anyhow, while international PES programs appear to be rare.
Nevertheless, there are also numerous authors, who argue for an
upscaling of PES schemes to maximize the conservation of ES,
even though “national government PES programs entail large and
complex governance structures involving multiple sequential
implementation steps at different geographic scales” (Ezzine-De-
Blas et al. 2016). It can be assumed that this also applies to
international PES programs. Especially regarding carbon ES, this
upscaling tendency is observable and promoted by global
institutions such as the World Bank, as is the case for the
international program “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation” (REDD+), which is seen by some
scholars as the largest operating PES experiment worldwide
(McElwee et al. 2014, Corbera 2012). To make national and
international programs work, some authors call for cross-scale
linkages between existing organizations and institutions at
different scales, rather than implementing a new governance
structure (Corbera et al. 2009, den Uyl and Driessen 2015, Cerra
2017). In such polycentric governance frameworks, intermediaries,
often from the civil, public, academic, or private sector, play a
central role in connecting different scales (Huber-Stearns et al.
2013, Cook et al. 2016, Schröter et al. 2018). However, the
upscaling of PES schemes remains challenging, because, for
example, the upscaling of ES valuations exacerbates existing
uncertainties (Kull et al. 2015). Additionally, in large-scale
programs, private fundraising becomes difficult, which is why
those programs are often governance-financed (den Uyl and
Driessen 2015). Furthermore, higher levels imply an increasing
number of potential stakeholders, making the consideration of
various interests challenging yet evermore necessary (Schleyer et
al. 2015).  
Last, environmental additionality gained at one place can be
defeated by environmental destructions occurring elsewhere
instead, which is called leakage effect (Engel and Muller 2016).
The reverse outcome is also possible: spillovers can enhance
conservation at other locations because of changes of social
norms, increased ecotourism opportunities, or the strengthening
of laws (Pattanayak et al. 2010). However, today’s long and
globally connected production chains are difficult to oversee,
making it complicated to analyze the causes and drivers of
environmental change (Friis et al. 2016).
PES programs are criticized from various angles
Critique of PES schemes is manifold and depends largely on the
authors’ backgrounds. The systematic literature review, which led
us to 29 eligible publications, pointed out different schools of
thought or movements criticizing the PES approach. However, it
must be taken into account that the inductive literature search
focusing on the politically highly controversial term “neoliberal”
as well as the term “neoclassical” narrows the view on the variety
of critique.  
Environmental economics provide the theoretical grounding for
the PES approach. This school of thought is strongly influenced
by neoclassical theory and follows the assumption that
environmental degradation is a result of market failures, namely
the exclusion of environmental costs in product prices (Scales
2015). Hence, environmental economists recommend the
implementation of valuation and commodification techniques to
internalize externalities (Perman et al. 2011). After reviewing the
identified publications and clustering the different points of
critique, we conclude that many critics can be assigned mainly to
two academic fields: ecological economics and political ecology.
Ecological economists are especially interested in the
interdependencies between ecology and economy, based on the
approach of strong sustainability, assuming that natural capital
cannot be substituted by any human-made capital (Gómez-
Baggethun et al. 2010). In contrast, political ecology addresses
the underlying structures of capitalism and power with regard to
the commodification of nature. Political ecology has its roots in
various fields such as rural critical geography, sociology, and
anthropology, and is influenced by, for example, Marx’s value
theory and egalitarian thoughts (Kallis et al. 2013, Huber 2017).
The assignment of the identified arguments, publications, and
authors to these groups is not always clear-cut, as the academic
fields themselves show overlaps. However, we are convinced that
keeping these academic fields in mind helps to better understand
the argumentation structures behind the critique.
Critique of the neoliberal patterns of the PES approach
PES are often described as part and expression of a broader
neoliberal agenda that follows a logic of accumulation and
economic growth. Critics see PES in line with the global diffusion
of a neoliberal narrative within the last decades, arguing “that the
[PES] approach implicitly accepts neoliberal capitalism as both
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the problem and the solution to the ecological crisis” (Fletcher
and Büscher 2017:224). Fletcher and Büscher call this “the PES
conceit.” This so-called “neoliberal conservation” or ”green
neoliberalism” (Büscher et al. 2012, Fletcher and Büscher 2017),
it is argued, pushes the valuation and commodification of nature
forward, building on the assumption that monetary incentives are
the best way for governing human behavior (Allen 2018, Fletcher
2010).  
The term “neoliberalism” itself  is controversially discussed. Some
authors deny that PES programs are a neoliberal tool, since only
very few PES schemes can be described as markets for ES
grounded in competition (McElwee et al. 2014, Matulis 2017, Van
Hecken et al. 2018). Others describe PES as a neoliberal
instrument, even though most PES schemes rather masquerade
as markets (Matulis 2017). They justify their conviction by
drawing on Foucault’s theory of governmentality elucidating “a
process of repeated practice and inscribed procedure, through
which complicit assumptions and behavioral codes become
routine” (Wynne-Jones 2014:149). Regarding PES this means that
symbolic meanings such as the monetary valuations of ES aimed
at gaining attention for ES protection are often forerunners of
the commodification and marketization of ES (Fletcher and
Büscher 2017). This is explained by monetary incentives, whether
based on true markets or not, introducing a neoliberal thinking
in commodities and exchange values. Foucault’s governmentality
is strongly connected with the term “performativity,” which
describes how language, thoughts, and narratives shape concrete
actions (Kolinjivadi et al. 2017). Thus, neoliberalism is
understood as a process rather than as an outcome. Because most
PES schemes are hybrid instruments incorporating both market-
like and regulatory instruments through state intervention, some
scholars use alternative terms such as “hybrid neoliberalism”
(McCarthy 2005, McAfee and Shapiro 2010) or “social
neoliberalism” (Cerney et al. 2005). All in all, an allocation of
PES in the neoliberalism discourse becomes difficult because of
the diverse definitions of PES as well as the term “neoliberalism.”
For providing an analytical basis for the degree of
neoliberalization of PES programs, the discussion of various
levels of commodification could be useful (Muradian et al. 2010,
Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011, Hahn et al. 2015).
Critique of the monetary valuation and commodification of ES
The valuation of ES in monetary terms as well as the expression
in exchange values is central to many publications criticizing PES.
This major field of critique is to be seen as a cross-sectional theme
touching fields of critique in the social as well as in the ecological
sphere and can be referred to all PES definitions. Generally
speaking, values describe and rank “the importance of actions”
(Graeber 2001:49) and “are embedded in, and reproduced
through social exchange” (Allen 2018:244). Monetary valuation
is only one of many types of valuation. Scholars criticize that
monetary valuations follow a market thinking, which is based on
the prioritization of exchange values over use values (Scales 2015),
thereby following an understanding of weak sustainability in
which ecosystem services and functions can be substituted with
other ES or even human-made capital (Biely et al. 2018).
Following this line, critics argue that monetization supports a
utilitarian rationality and a pure interest in profit-maximization,
which abets the view on economic agents as “homo economicus”
(McAfee 2012, Kull et al. 2015, Van Hecken et al. 2018). Ignoring
other valuation languages is said to neglect alternative
rationalities such as intrinsic, fundamental, eudaemonistic, and
instrumental values of nature (Muniz and Cruz 2015). Thus, the
articulation of ES in exchange values undermines “the social
complexity necessary for sustainability” (Allen 2018:253).
Therefore, many scholars plead for a plurality of values in the
context of nature conservation (Kallis et al. 2013, Muniz and Cruz
2015). If  value plurality is not considered, a potential crowding-
out of intrinsic motivations is often mentioned as a barrier for
successful nature conservation (Corbera 2012, Hahn et al. 2015,
Scales 2015). The result could be that “the willingness to accept
will be more enticing than the willingness to change” (Muniz and
Cruz 2015:10911). However, whether PES result in crowding-out
or crowding-in seems strongly dependent on the incentive type,
namely, truly monetary or rather in-kind incentives, as well as on
the social and cultural background of the participating agents
(Rode et al. 2015).  
Various critics argue that the monetization of ES goes together
with a commodification of ES and describe these tendencies as,
for example, “commodity fetishism” (Kosoy and Corbera 2010)
or “complexity blinder” (Norgaard 2010). Consequently, these
simplifications would conceal the complexity and interconnectedness
of ecosystems, for example when some PES programs focus on
carbon ES while excluding other important ES (Kallis et al. 2013).
When commodifying ES, the problem is identified that nature “is
not produced specifically for the purpose of exchange” (Scales
2015:228). Thus, the exchange is often based on incomplete and
contested ES commodification (McElwee 2012), which is
formatted “through the creation of new institutions and
technologies” (Scales 2015:228). Necessary enabling conditions
for the exchange are commodities with clear boundaries and
values as well as clearly defined property rights, conditions that
can rarely be guaranteed and that often differ between ES types,
regions, and cultures (Kosoy and Corbera 2010, Scales 2015). The
commodification of ES is further complicated by many ES
resisting to be commodified because of their public good or
commons character (Bakker 2003). Therefore, PES programs run
into the danger of rather focusing on ES that are easy to
commodify, such as carbon ES, instead of integrating complex
bundles of ES into the schemes.  
The underlying valuation methods are also viewed critically
because the measurement and calculation of ES is often difficult,
e.g., due to incomplete information and scientific uncertainties
regarding ecosystem functioning (Muradian et al. 2010, McAfee
2016). Scientific uncertainty applies also to the relationship
between ES provision and land use practices as well as to social-
ecological systems more generally (Lima et al. 2017). A further
problem is related to the additionality of PES programs. In
practice, it is very challenging to verify whether or not a
sustainable land use practice would have been implemented in the
absence of PES anyhow (McAfee 2016). This becomes even more
difficult when considering the aforementioned leakage effects.
Critique regarding social and institutional aspects
Many scholars criticize PES and their neoliberal character for
reinforcing social inequalities. Although PES are often acclaimed
as a potential win-win approach reaching important ecological
and equity goals simultaneously, various authors argue that the
implemented PES programs rarely consider important aspects of
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environmental justice (Kosoy and Corbera 2010, Muradian et al.
2010, Muradian et al. 2013, Muniz and Cruz 2015, Fletcher and
Büscher 2017). Different dimensions of justice are mentioned in
the literature, which are often unaddressed by PES schemes, such
as distributional, procedural, and participatory justice as well as
justice of recognition and of capabilities (Muniz and Cruz 2015).
Taking these different dimensions of justice into account, PES
arguably produce winners and losers (Blanchard et al. 2016),
which some critics explain with the effects of a neoliberal market
logic and the related consequences of performativity and
governmentality (Fletcher and Büscher 2017).  
Many scholars assume that inequalities are a result of the
underlying power structures and power imbalances, which are
paid too little attention in the implementation process of PES
programs. This cluster of critique follows often a political ecology
thinking. Power imbalances find their expression already in the
valuation process, because institutions and power structures
shape the monetary valuation of ES (Kallis et al. 2013). In the
case of already implemented PES programs, power imbalances
find their manifestation in inequalities between the different
actors. In many publications, the disempowerment of local people
is considered central. A study by Cavanagh and Benjaminsen
(2014) focuses on the attempted establishment of a carbon market
in Uganda, which led “to the eviction of the local people, without
any compensation for their loss of land, property, and
livelihoods” (Matheus 2018:31). The influence of experts and of
unelected institutions such as CSOs increases in these cases, which
could then influence decisions at the expense of the local people
(Corbera 2012, Apostolopoulou et al. 2014). Often, elite interests
become dominant (Roth and Dressler 2012), while interests of
disadvantaged people or those with a traditional lifestyle are
ignored (McElwee 2012, Muniz and Cruz 2015). Additionally,
because privatized land is often seen as an important pre-
condition for the implementation of PES programs, people
holding formal land titles, i.e., people who are anyhow wealthier
than others, are advantaged during PES implementation
(Corbera 2012). These different concerns are often accompanied
by a lack of participatory and procedural justice in PES programs.
Therefore, some authors call for the development of participation
methods to better recognize the perceptions of local people
(Petheram and Campbell 2010, Corbera 2012, Bétrisey et al.
2016). Some scholars see also risks of depoliticization and a
weakening of democratic structures when responsibilities move
from governments to the market sphere (Swyngedouw 2000).  
On a global level, critics highlight that the compensation logic of
PES potentially increases North-South inequalities and fosters
rebound effects. However, these arguments against PES follow an
understanding of internationalized PES programs and contradict
the current manifestation of mostly local or regional schemes.
Therefore, it is once more important to consider the variety of
PES definitions. Currently, this debate is particularly relevant for
carbon ES, e.g., in the context of REDD+, and for other programs
that generate their funding globally, while the direct ES benefits
are distributed at a local level. Although one could assume that
the voluntary entering of PES programs by and the additional
financial resources for the ES providers leads to an increase of
the sovereignty of Global South countries as well as of local
communities there, critics argue that PES schemes might
undermine sovereignty when the economically powerful countries
of the Global North and international organizations such as the
World Bank shape the implementation process because of
prevailing power imbalances, thereby leading to a reinforcement
of (neo-)colonial logics (Muniz and Cruz 2015, Matheus 2018).
Moreover, the disparities between these countries might be
reinforced because of the lower opportunity and offset costs of
poorer Global South countries, where compensations take place
accordingly. This problem is known as “the poor sell cheap”
principle (Martínez-Alier 2002, 2014). It implies that the
compensation logic might exacerbate North-South inequalities
and lead to rebound effects in Global North countries, because
compensation schemes give consumers a justification for
sustaining their resource-intense lifestyle (Muniz and Cruz 2015).
Additionally, scholars point out the danger of so-called “green
grabbing” because PES programs might lead to an increasing
competition for property rights on valuable ES-providing land
(Fairhead et al. 2012, Van Hecken et al. 2015).  
Overall, the different schools of thought highlight different points
of criticism. Whereas ecological economists put a specific focus
on the value debate, political ecologists stress the underlying
power structures and inequalities, but their criticism often
converges. However, it is important to consider that even within
one research tradition the views on PES can vary. Furthermore,
our review indicates that, particularly over the last years, degrowth
proponents developed rather PES-critical positions (e.g., Muniz
and Cruz 2015). Degrowth scrutinizes the predominant economic
growth-paradigm in economy and politics, the feasibility of
decoupling GDP-growth and resource consumption, as well as
the hegemonic understanding and measurement of prosperity
(D’Alisa et al. 2016, Parrique et al. 2019). Degrowth conceives an
alternative economy that is based on a new understanding of
welfare. However, a clear position on PES cannot be derived from
this perspective, especially because not all degrowth proponents
strictly reject market-based conservation instruments (Petschow
et al. 2018).
DISCUSSION
This literature review revealed important information about the
diversity of PES understandings, about the importance of
considering spatial scale impacts on PES program effectiveness,
and about various points of critique of this still novel
conservation instrument. In the following, we will highlight three
important issues: the need for a clear definition basis, the role of
the globalized economy for PES, and the potentials of collective
action for a successful design of PES programs.
Analytical research needs a clear definition basis
The high diversity of PES definitions potentially leads to
confusion and misalignment of expectations both in science and
for practitioners. A probable reason for these different
understandings lies in the various disciplinary backgrounds of
the proponents of those definitions. Possibly, also the popularity
of this tool in politics leads to a broadening of the concept because
it holds an incentive to label different instruments as PES, e.g., to
increase chances of funding. This broadening of the concept is
not all negative, because it introduces various perspectives on PES
that raise new questions, for example, regarding better
connections between ecological and social aims. However, for
empirical analyses of PES schemes a clear conceptual basis and
the development of a common understanding between the
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stakeholders, both in science and in practice, is important, as has
been emphasized by Martin-Ortega and Waylen (2018).  
Because the definitions differ regarding the question of whether
payers for ES must also be direct beneficiaries of these ES,
clarifying definitions is important for studying the scope and
success of schemes as well as any socioeconomic effects.
Furthermore, as the various PES definitions differ in terms of
market-closeness and levels of commodification of PES
programs, different points of critique apply in each case. The
definitions by Wunder (2005) and Muradian et al. (2010)
especially show huge differences regarding these questions.
Therefore, the diversity of understandings complicates the debate
about the success of PES programs, both from an ecological as
well as from a social perspective.  
Not only PES but also ES themselves are disparately defined.
Many authors refer to the definition of the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment stating that ES “are the benefits people obtain from
ecosystems” containing also “provisioning services such as food,
water, timber, and fiber” besides further regulating, cultural and
supporting services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005:V).
However, Danley and Widmark (2016), for example, show the
great diversity of ES understandings existent in the literature and
carved out that they build on three connected and overlapping
concepts: “... the physical components of the ecosystem
(structure), ... the functioning of and interaction between those
components (process or function), ... and the resulting
contribution to human welfare from the ecosystem (benefit or
benefit-providing service)” (Danley and Widmark 2016:134).
Thereby, they highlight the natural science view on ES by
referring, for example, to Daily (1997). She highlights the
functions and processes of a specific ecosystem structure when
defining ES as “conditions and processes through which natural
ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill
human life” (Daily 1997:3). Also Farley and Costanza (2010) refer
to ecosystem functions and processes based on a particular
ecosystem structure, when calling for a differentiation between on
one hand stock-flow resources that are harvestable at a specific
rate and physically convertible, the ecosystem goods, and on the
other hand only qualitatively changeable fund-services that “are
a particular type of flow, or flux, generated by a particular
configuration of stock-flow resources,” the ecosystem services
(Farley and Costanza 2010:2062). According to this definition,
building on the flow-funds model by Georgescu-Roegen (1971),
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment definition of provisioning
services refers to stock-flow resources rather than to any services.
In contrast, the economic view focusing on natural capital defines
ES merely as “ecological things or characteristics, not functions
or processes” (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007:620). Such differing views
on ES also influence the understandings of what PES are and
which designs are most suitable to tackle the problem of ES
degeneration. In particular, the natural science view seeing ES as
processes and functions leads to the conclusion that many ES can
be compared to public or quasi-public goods (Diswandi 2017),
inasmuch they are resistant to classical commodification
processes because they are non-rival and non-excludable. This
might lead to major confusion in the debate of whether PES are
forerunners of commodification processes or not.  
We agree with defining ES as fund-services. However, we argue
that PES designs in practice often use proxies for evaluating and
valuing the current state of ES. These proxies help to create a
certain degree of excludability and rivalry on ES with public or
common good characteristics. Thus, PES might increase
commodification processes by raising funding on the
beneficiaries’ side for particular ES proxies, e.g., water quality as
a proxy for the capacity of the ecosystem to purify water. For
example, Coasean-like PES programs are based on private
funding to pay providers of ES using proxies to measure the
quality of these services. The price is then determined in the
bargaining process. It is important to acknowledge, however, that
such bargaining and valuation processes are also part of
government-paid PES schemes, even though a market with
various sellers and buyers is not existent in this case. ES proxies
are usually not classical economic goods because they are not
discrete and physically transformable entities. Instead, in these
cases “fictitious commodities” (Polanyi 1957) play a central role:
“Because most PES schemes often rely on external assessments
of the value of these environmental services to birth the
commodities that can be traded and sold, such constructions are
similar to what Polanyi deemed ‚fictitious commodities’ in that
they do not exist in-toto, but must be created, resulting in
commodification that is always incomplete and contested
(Polanyi, 1957, p. 76)” (McElwee 2012:414). Another example for
such fictitious commodities is the creation of CO2 certificates and
a market trade of such certificates that is coupled with the CO2 
sequestration and storage capacity of forests. Additionally,
already marketed ecosystem goods (stock-flow resources) can be
used as ES-proxy carrier, for example, by applying ES proxy-
related price premiums on eco-certified timber from sustainable
sources. However, there are differing views existent whether price
premiums can be counted as PES or not (Hahn et al. 2015).
Generally, it remains challenging to raise private funding for ES
proxies, for example, because imposing full excludability for ES
is seldom possible. Therefore, free-rider problems might hinder
the motivation of ES beneficiaries to pay. Furthermore, the
scarcity of those services is often not obvious because the negative
consequences of ES degradation are often not directly visible, but
rather in the long run. In an economic system, where short-term
profits play an important role, the values of such ES get
discounted, which diminishes funding sources. Here we see one
reason why government-paid PES programs are so common.  
Following the view of ES as fund-services, we highlight three
central aspects that ease the distinction of PES programs from
other environmental policy instruments. First, we see the use of
positive incentives, monetary or in-kind, as an inevitable key
criterion of PES. Second, contractual conditionality is central to
PES and strongly coupled with monitoring practices that either
focus on measurable proxies for the quality of ES or on specific
land use practices and changes, where an increase of ES benefits
can be assumed. This implies that various levels of ES
commodification are imaginable depending on the ES type in
focus, as well as on the chosen PES design. Third, entering the
conditional PES contracts must be voluntary, at least on the ES
providing side. We forego the criterion of full voluntariness to
include also governmentally paid programs and to consider
various actor constellations reaching from market-close to less
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market-based programs, recognizing that the term “market-
based” remains fuzzy in the literature. If  ES providers are
monetarily compensated for abiding by legal obligations for ES
protection, we do not consider these payments as PES, but rather
as compensations for legal restrictions. Furthermore, our
definition leaves open whether ES buyers have to be direct
beneficiaries or not because this criterion is more likely to cause
ambiguity than clarity, given the different characteristics of the
various existent ES regarding, for example, their spatial location.
These criteria provide the necessary balance between the precision
required for empirically testing hypotheses, for example,
regarding the effectiveness of PES programs, and the openness
needed to integrate the various PES design approaches that we
find in practice. We share Wunder’s (2015) view that ex-post
criteria are not useful for a typology of PES programs because
such features do not focus on the PES design but on the resultant
social and ecological effectiveness.
Evaluating PES in the context of the globalized economy
Our review of scale-related issues in PES points to a great need
to deepen the research about the connections and influences of
the globalized economy with regard to PES program effectiveness.
Some important issues have already been stressed in this review,
namely, the debate about local versus up-scaled PES schemes,
challenges related to leakage effects, and the existence of inequity
aspects that arise, for example, from the North-South disparities
in the case of international PES programs. However, it is rarely
discussed how local, regional, and global scales can be linked
within PES programs, while considering equity and ecological
aspects as well. One exception are Farley and Costanza (2010),
who, regarding the implementation of multiscale IPES, state that
“mutually reinforcing institutions at local, regional and global
scales over short, medium and long time scales will be required.
Institutions should be designed to ensure the flow of information
between scales, to take ownership regimes, cultures, and actors
into account, and to fully internalize costs and benefits” (Farley
and Costanza 2010:2061). A challenge lies in the development of
just schemes guaranteeing the engagement of all stakeholders at
all scales and sustainable and fair funding structures. To refine
successful multiscale PES schemes, it could be helpful to compare
existing PES schemes at various scales regarding different
ecological and distributional criteria. Furthermore, it would be
interesting to draw linkages between the PES and the telecoupling
approach that focuses on distal connections and feedbacks
shaping current land use changes (Friis et al. 2016). Other scale
aspects such as the temporal dimension should also be addressed
in the future.
Rediscovering the strengths of collective action in the context of
PES
In our view, land tenure regimes should receive greater
consideration in PES research. Many critics argue that PES
reinforce commodification and thereby privatization tendencies,
which potentially lead to social conflicts depending on the
underlying power structures (Vatn 2010). The PES criteria we
distilled from prevailing definitions focus particularly on the ES
providers’ side and underline their voluntary signing of PES
contracts. This implies that PES schemes need owners of ES
providing land, who possess a bundle of ownership and disposal
rights that allows them to decide how to use their land, whether
they secure ES and receive PES in return or manage their land
without a focus on ES securing management practices. Different
authors highlight that these rights are often assigned to private
(legal) persons, which supports the advancing privatization of
land (Porras et al. 2008, Vatn 2010, Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-
Pérez 2011, McElwee 2012). The review revealed that
privatizations can have negative social implications, for example,
the displacement of local and poorer land users by wealthier
people that have both money and power to acquire land titles
(Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014, Scales 2015). In this regard,
the interactions between PES effectiveness and the design of the
rights of disposal as well as the question of who owns the property
rights for the ES providing ecosystems is of key interest, but still
insufficiently studied.  
Debates about PES often fall short of the fact that PES can be
based on private-individual or on common property (Farley and
Costanza 2010). This issue affects especially the question of how
the local actors are coordinated and how the different types of
property rights, such as management, access, or withdrawal rights,
are distributed at the relevant levels of governance (Schlager and
Ostrom 1992). Hence, there is potential to connect PES with the
commons debate. Ostrom (1990) describes how commons have
been successfully managed for centuries. Particularly, she
highlights the advantages of interlaced and complex local
governmental systems that allow for a direct participation and
cooperation of citizens instead of centralized state interventions
or privatizations of commons. However, three decades later,
private property rights are even more popular in the debate about
environmental policy instruments.  
We call for a shift in focus toward local collective governance, also
in the context of PES. An increasing number of research activities
now address so-called collective or community-based PES
programs that aim at incentivizing the protection of ES for
communities that own land under common property rather than
for individual, private land owners (Muradian 2013, Hayes et al.
2017, Brownson et al. 2019, Hayes et al. 2019). Such collective
PES schemes provide a promising opportunity for successful
nature conservation that is potentially less dependent on
privatizations. In the literature, various advantages of such
collective PES programs are mentioned already, such as the
lowering of transactions costs, the improvement of the local social
capital when supporting collective community governance, or
greater distributive justice (Nieratka et al. 2015, Narloch et al.
2017, Brownson et al. 2019). However, evidence of a potentially
greater social as well as ecological effectiveness of collective PES
is scarce, contradictory, and highly context dependent (Gatiso et
al. 2018), which makes clear statements about the success of such
collective schemes difficult. In order to analyze whether and under
which circumstances collective PES are successful, we argue that
it is important to analytically differentiate between individual and
collective PES in the context of the diversity of the existing
definitions. Furthermore, we see an urgent need for in-depth
research on whether collective PES could be an opportunity to
de-neoliberalize and de-commodify PES or whether they are still
just another forerunner of expansive commodification,
privatization, and commercialization of ecosystems. In this
context, we also see the necessity for a scientific debate about the
design of contractual conditionality, especially whether the
payments are linked with well-defined and commodified ES
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(proxies) or only with bundles of ES by coupling payments with
specific land use practices, which are tested for their ES securing
effects from time to time. Therefore, the design of conditionality,
as well as the form of the payment negotiation processes, strongly
affects the degree of commodification and the market-closeness
within PES programs. In order to gain a better understanding of
these issues it would seem important to systematically bring
together various disciplinary perspectives and practitioners’
knowledge in an inter- and transdisciplinary research mode.
CONCLUSION
The systematic literature review provided novel insights into the
current state of PES research. The classification of existing
definitions revealed that there is no common understanding of
PES in the scientific community. The diversity of definitions
should be considered when evaluating the success of PES
programs, especially with regard to the influence of scale on
program effectiveness. Similarly, the analysis of existing critique
showed that different authors work with different PES definitions,
which makes the comparison and juxtaposition of their findings
difficult.  
Future research should take the differences between existing PES
definitions into account to ensure the comparability of results.
The linkages of local, regional, and global scales should be
considered for successful PES design and analysis. A re-focusing
of research on common instead of private property rights could
provide novel insights on and help enhance local and collective
governance systems for a sustainable use of resources.
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“(1) […] voluntary transaction[s] where (2) a well-defined 
service (or a land-use likely to secure that service) (3) is 
being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer (4) from a 
(minimum one) ES provider (5) if and only if the ES 





Corbera et al. 
(2007:366) 
“MES and PES consist of transferring economic resources 
from providers to consumers of ecosystem services so that 
the former benefit economically while the latter receive 
the right to use the resources provided by the service in 
question. The difference between MES and PES resides in 
their underlying institutional framework. […] PES are not 
actual markets where ecosystem services are sold to 
service buyers. The commodity is ill-defined, and, in most 
cases, governments play an intermediary role by 
mobilizing resources from consumers to a government 
fund, which then distributes financial resources to 





PES “generally have two common features. First, they are 
voluntary. Second, participation involves a contract 
between the conservation agent and the landowner. The 
landowner agrees to manage an ecosystem according to 
agreed-upon rules and receives a payment (in-kind or 




et al. (2009:2) 
 
“approaches that aim to (1) transfer positive incentives to 
environmental service providers that are (2) conditional on 
the provision of the services, where successful 
implementation is based on a consideration of (1) 
additionality and (2) varying institutional contexts” 
 
L 
Milder et al. 
(2010:1) 
 
“Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is a market-based 
approach to environmental management that compensates 
land stewards for ecosystem conservation and restoration. 
[...] We define PES to include direct payments from 
ecosystem service beneficiaries to land stewards, as well 
S 
as indirect payments earned through eco-certified 






“a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims 
to create incentives to align individual and/or collective 
land use decisions with the social interest in the 
management of natural resources. Such transfers 
(monetary or non-monetary) are embedded in social 
relations, values and perceptions, which are decisive in 






“a payment to an agent for services provided to other 
agents (wherever they may be in space and time) by 
means of a deliberate action aimed at preserving, restoring 
or increasing an environmental service agreed by the 
parties. PES therefore result from a voluntary agreement 
between parties, in other words they are based on 
contracts that are explicit or implicit (oral agreements), 
and which set out the service expected and the 
corresponding payments, as well as for how long the 
service must be provided” 
 
S 
Porras et al. 
(2013:7) 
 
“A transaction in which a supplier or seller of the 
ecosystem service is responding to the offer of 
compensation from a single or multiple beneficiaries 
(NGO, private party, local or central government entity) 
and/ or a beneficiary separate from the seller which is not 
a central government entity, compensation is conditional 
upon the land management practices specified by the 
program, and the voluntary component is only attached to 
the supply-side of the transaction in that the provider 






“PES scheme is a transparent system for the additional 
provision of environmental services through conditional 
payments to voluntary providers. […] PES schemes are 
essentially instruments to maintain or recreate the supply 
of ES through the provision of incentives” 
 
L 
Smith et al. 
(2013:13) 
“[…] PES is used to describe schemes in which the 
beneficiaries, or users, of ecosystem services provide 
payment to the stewards, or providers, of ecosystem 
services. In practice, PES often involves a series of 
payments to land or other natural resource managers in 
return for a guaranteed flow of ecosystem services (or, 
more commonly, for management actions likely to 
enhance their provision) over-and-above what would 
otherwise be provided in the absence of payment. 
S 
Payments are made by the beneficiaries of the services in 
question, for example, individuals, communities, 






“a positive economic incentive where environmental 
service (ES) providers can voluntarily apply for a payment 
that is conditional either on ES provision or on an activity 





“(1) voluntary transactions (2) between service users (3) 
and service providers (4) that are conditional on agreed 
rules of natural resource management (5) for generating 
offsite services” 
L 
Davies et al. 
(2018:160) 
 
“‘a transfer of resources between ES buyers and sellers 
that aims to improve provision of ES for the benefit of 
society and the environment’ The following principles 
apply: 
• Voluntariness – stakeholders ideally enter into a PES 
agreement on a voluntary basis, however governments 
may act on their behalf, or regulate involvement, if 
necessary. 
• Payment source – payments are made by the 
beneficiaries of ES (citizens, businesses, or governments 
acting on their behalf). This includes those benefitting 
from reputational enhancement or actions that compensate 
for (unregulated) environmental harm. 
• Conditionality – payment is conditional on the delivery 
of quantified ES, or on the implementation of robust land 
use practices proven to deliver ES benefits. 
• Additionality – ES benefits (or proxy land use practices) 
are over- and-above the baseline (or business-as-usual) 







Table A2. Coding system for the systematic literature review addressing the influence of 
spatial scales on PES program effectiveness; cited literature is assigned to the main categories 
of the coding system and divided into publications directly identified in the literature review 





Publication identified in 
the literature review (L) or 
via snowball system (S) 
 
Scale of ES 
provision versus 
scale of ES 
benefits 
 
Corbera et al. 2009 
Farley et al. 2010 
Kemkes et al. 2010 
Banerjee et al. 2013 
Huber-Stearns et al. 2013 
Den Uyl and Driessen 2015 



















Corbera et al. 2009 
Loft 2011 
Van der Horst 2011 
Reed et al. 2014 
den Uyl and Driessen 2015 
Favretto et al. 2016 
Cerra 2017 
Huber-Stearns et al. 2017 
















Farley et al. 2010 
Kemkes et al. 2010 
Banerjee et al. 2013 
Lockie 2013 
OECD 2013 
Agrawal et al. 2014 
den Uyl and Driessen 2015 
Grima et al. 2016 
Paudyal et al. 2016 



















Corbera et al. 2009 
Corbera 2012 
Huber-Stearns et al. 2013 
McElwee et al. 2014 
Den Uyl and Driessen 2015 







Schleyer et al. 2015 
Cook et al. 2016 
Ezzine-De-Blas et al. 2016 
Cerra 2017 










Pattanayak et al. 2010 






Table A3. Coding system for the systematic literature review addressing critique of the PES 
approach; cited literature is assigned to the main categories of the coding system and divided 
into publications directly identified in the literature review and further publications identified 
based on a snowball system. 
Category  
 









Critique of the 
neoliberal patterns 










Büscher et al. 2012 








of the term 
“neoliberalism” 
Büscher et al. 2012 
Matulis 2013 
Apostolopoulou et al. 2014 
McElwee et al. 2014 
Hahn et al. 2015 
Matulis 2017 










Cerney et al. 2005 
Higgins et al. 2014 
Wynne-Jones 2014 
Fletcher and Büscher 2017 






















Kallis et al. 2013 
Hahn et al. 2015 
Kull et al. 2015 
Muniz and Cruz 2015 
Rode et al. 2015 
Scales 2015 
Allen 2018 
Van Hecken et al. 2018 


















Kosoy and Corbera 2010 
Norgaard 2010 
McElwee 2012 












Muradian et al. 2010 
McAfee 2016 








are not paid 
enough attention  
Kosoy and Corbera 2010 
Muradian et al. 2010 
Muradian et al. 2013 
Muniz and Cruz 2015 
Blanchard et al. 2016 















Petheram and Campbell 2010 
Corbera 2012 
McElwee 2012 
Roth and Dressler 2012 
Kallis et al. 2013 
Apostolopoulou et al. 2014 
Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014 
Muniz and Cruz 2015 




















Fairhead et al. 2012 
Martínez-Alier 2014 
Muniz and Cruz 2015 
Van Hecken et al. 2015 
Matheus 2018 
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L 
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